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Summary This paper proposes a novel robust audio 
watermarking algorithm to embed data and extract it in a bit-
exact manner based on changing the magnitudes of the FFT 
spectrum. The key point is selecting a frequency band for 
embedding based on the comparison between the original and the 
MP3 compressed/decompressed signal and on a suitable scaling 
factor. The experimental results show that the method has a very 
high capacity (about 5 kbps), without significant perceptual 
distortion (ODG about –0.25) and provides robustness against 
common audio signal processing such as added noise, filtering 
and MPEG compression (MP3). Furthermore, the proposed 
method has a larger capacity (number of embedded bits to 
number of host bits rate) than recent image data hiding methods. 
Key words: Audio watermarking, Fast Fourier Transform 
(FFT). 
1. Introduction 
The easy transmission and manipulation of digital media 
has led to a strong demand for watermarking schemes. 
Since the human auditory system is more sensitive than the 
visual system, to develop a high-performance audio 
watermarking technique is a challenging task. Considering 
the embedding domain, audio watermarking techniques 
can be classified into time domain and frequency domain 
methods. Phase modulation [1] and echo hiding [2] are 
well known methods in the time domain.  
In frequency domain watermarking [3-8], after taking 
one of the usual transforms such as the Discrete/Fast 
Fourier Transform (DFT/FFT), the Modified Discrete 
Cosine Transform (MDCT) or the Wavelet Transform 
(WT) from the signal, the hidden bits are embedded into 
the resulting transform coefficients. In [6, 8] the FFT 
domain is selected to embed watermarks for making use of 
the translation-invariant property of the FFT coefficients to 
resist small distortions in the time domain. In particular, 
[8] shows that the FFT domain provides excellent 
robustness against MP3 compression. In fact, using 
methods based on transforms provides better perceptual 
quality and robustness against common attacks at the price 
of increasing the computational complexity. 
In the algorithm suggested in this paper, selecting the 
frequency band and a scaling factor are the tuning steps. 
We consider that a safe area for embedding information is 
the frequency range at which the difference between the 
FFT magnitudes of the original and the MP3 
compressed/decompressed signals is lower than a 
threshold. Moreover, to strengthen the robustness against 
attacks, a scaling factor is used. This factor adjusts the 
value which is added to the FFT magnitudes in the 
embedding step. For embedding, the FFT magnitudes are 
first scaled and rounded to the nearest integer. Then, the 
selected frequency band is scanned and when we meet a 
magnitude with the value larger than one, it is incremented. 
If the magnitude is equal to zero it is incremented if the 
corresponding embedding bit is ‘1’, otherwise the 
magnitude is not altered. The experimental results show 
that this method has a very high capacity (about 5 kbps), 
provides robustness against common signal processing 
attacks, and entails very low perceptual distortion. Using 
FFT magnitudes, real  imag , results in better 
robustness against attacks compared to using the real or 
the imaginary parts.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, the proposed method is presented. In Section 3, 
the experimental results are shown. Finally, Section 4 
summarizes the most relevant conclusions of this research. 
2. Proposed method 
In this scheme, we use the following method to embed a 
bit stream (secret bits) into a set of various numbers (FFT 
coefficients). In the set of numbers, the number which is 
most frequently encountered than others in the set is 
selected to embed the hidden bits. For example, in A = {0  
2  3  4  7  1  0  2  0  2  1  0}, the zero value is selected. 
Then, all numbers larger than the selected value (in this 
case zero) are incremented (shifted) A’ = {0  3  4  5  8  2  0  
3  0  3 2  0}. Note that, in the shifted A’, there is no 
number with value equal to 1. Finally, in the embedding 
step, the stream is scanned and the secret bits (“0110”) are 
embedded. When we meet “0” in the stream, if 
corresponding secret bit is “0”, it will not be changed, but 
if it is equal to “1” it should be incremented. The marked 
set of values is then A* = {0  3  4  5  8  2  1  3  1  3  2  0}.  
At the detector side, the secret bits are extracted and, then, 
all values larger than the selected value are decremented 
As mentioned above, we have chosen the FFT 
domain to embed the hidden data in order to exploit the 
translation-invariant property of the FFT transform such 
that small distortions in the time domain can be resisted. 
Compared to other schemes, such as quantization or 
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odd/even modulation, keeping the relationship of FFT 
coefficient pairs is a more realistic scheme under several 
distortions.  
2.1 Tuning  
This method is based on using near zero values of 
FFT magnitudes in a selected frequency band. The method 
needs integer values for the FFT magnitude in the 
embedding step. Thus, the magnitudes in the selected band 
are multiplied by a scaling factor s and then rounded to the 
nearest integer. This scaling and rounding process 
generates a great deal of zero values in the integer 
magnitudes. The frequency band and the scaling value (s) 
are the two parameters of this method which adjust 
capacity, perceptual distortion and robustness. 
To select the frequency band, the considered points 
are as described below: 
1. The selected band should have as many zeros as 
possible after scaling (multiplying by s) and 
rounding. The number of zeros identifies the 
capacity. 
2. In the selected band, the difference between the 
magnitudes of the FFT coefficients of the original 
and the MP3 compressed/decompressed signals 
should be small. 
To select the scaling factor s, the following points 
should be considered: 
1. By increasing the scaling factor s, the error of the 
scaling and rounding step decreases and results in 
better perceptual distortion and lower capacity. 
2. After the embedding steps, the magnitudes with 
value zero at which “1” is embedded are changed 
to 1/s. To obtain the secret bits after attacks, 1/s 
should be larger than difference between the 
original magnitudes and the attacked magnitudes. 
Fig. 1 shows the flowchart for the selection of the tuning 
parameters. We select the frequency band from 15 kHz as 
low frequency and the cut-off frequency of MP3 as the 
high frequency. For example, the cut-off frequency of 
MP3-128 is around 17 kHz.  If there are not enough 
magnitudes with zero value (after scaling and rounding), 
the selected frequency band should be expanded by 
decreasing the low frequency band. Since 8 kHz is start of 
high frequencies it is selected as the limitation. In the 
flowchart, the required capacity is denoted by cap, Nz is 
the number of zeros in selected frequency band and Lf is 
low frequency of the selected band. As the flowchart 
shows, decreasing s increases 1/s which is used for 
detecting secret information. In the initialization, the 
parameters s is equal to 10.0. Most FFT magnitudes in the 
selected frequency band are between 0 and 10, hence with 
s in the interval [0.1, 10.0] with 0.1 steps we do not miss 
significant magnitudes and increase the number of zeros in 
the frequency band simultaneously. 
          
Fig. 1. Flowchart of tuning steps 
 
The watermarking scheme presented here is positional. 
This means that the detector must be synchronized in order 
to recover the embedded bits correctly. In a real 
application, the cover signal would be divided into several 
blocks of a few seconds and it is essential that the detector 
can determine the position (the beginning sample) of each 
of these blocks. One of the most practical solutions to 
solve this problem is to use synchronization marks such 
that the detector can determine the beginning of each 
block. Several synchronization strategies have been 
described in the literature (for example [10, 11]) and any 
of them can be used together with the method described 
here in order to produce a practical self-synchronizing 
solution. A self-synchronized version of the proposed 
scheme (using the synchronization approach described in 
[10]) has been implemented and the results are shown in 
Section 3.
 
2.2 Embedding algorithm 
The embedding steps are as follows: 
1. Calculate the FFT of the audio signal. We can use 
the whole file (for short clips, e.g. with less than 
one minute) or blocks of a given length (e.g. 10 
seconds) for longer files. 
2. Use the s selected in the tuning step as a 
parameter to convert the FFT magnitudes in the 
selected frequency band to integer values 
(multiplying them by s and then rounding). 
3. Scan all the integer FFT magnitudes in the 
selected band. If a magnitude is larger than zero, 
then increase it by one. After this step we have no 
magnitude with the value one. 
4. Scan again all integer FFT magnitudes in selected 
band. When a zero magnitude is found, if the 
corresponding embedded bit is “1” add one to the 
magnitude. Otherwise, the magnitude is not 
changed. After this step all magnitudes with value 
zero or one represent an embedded bit.  
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5. Embed s and the frequency band limits in their 
reserved positions as described in the end of this 
section. This step must take into account security 
concerns, as detailed below. 
6. The marked (FFT) signal is achieved by dividing 
all the magnitudes by s. 
7. In the previous embedding steps, the FFT phases 
are not altered. The marked audio signal in the 
time domain is obtained by applying the inverse 
FFT with the new magnitudes and the original 
FFT phases.  
2.3 Extraction algorithm  
The watermark extraction is performed by using the 
FFT transform and the tuning parameters. Since the host 
audio signal is not required in the detection process, the 
detector is blind. The detection process can be summarized 
into the following steps: 
1. Calculate the FFT of the marked audio signal. 
2. Extract the s and the frequency band from special 
positions (this step requires the use of a secret 
key). 
3. To achieve the scaled FFT magnitudes in selected 
frequency band, multiply them by s. 
4. Scan all the scaled FFT magnitudes in the 
selected band. If a magnitude with value in the 
interval [0, 1/2) is found, then the corresponding 
embedded bit is equal to “0” and the restored 
magnitude equals to zero. If the magnitude value 
is in the interval [1/2, 3/2), then the 
corresponding embedded bit is equal to “1” and 
the restored magnitude equals to zero. 
5. Scan all the scaled FFT magnitudes in the 
selected band. For each magnitude value in the 
interval [k+1/2, k+3/2), the restored magnitude 
equals to k (for k  > 1). 
6. The restored magnitudes are achieved by dividing 
them by s. 
7. Finally, use the IFFT to achieve the restored 
audio signal.  
For example, assume that the magnitudes at the selected 
frequency band are (0.9  0.4  0.2  0.1  1.4  0.15), s = 2 and 
Table 1. embedding and extracting steps 
steps FFT magnitudes 
em
b
edding
 
calculate FFT 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.4 0.15 
scaling 1.8 0.8 0.4 0.2 2.8 0.3 
rounding 2 1 0 0 3 0 
shifting 3 2 0 0 4 0 
embedding 3 2 0 1 4 0 
Dividing by s 1.5 1 0 0.5 2 0 
extracting
 
Scaling 3 2 0 1 4 0 
Detecting 3 2 0 0 4 0 
Shifting back 2 1 0 0 3 0 
Dividing by s 1 0.5 0 0 1.5 0 
the secret bit stream is “010”. Table 1 summarizes all steps 
of embedding and extracting. 
It is worth pointing out that the tuning parameters (s and 
the frequency band) should be used in receiver to detect 
the secret information. In the embedding steps, a few 
special spaces are kept for saving tuning parameters. The 
FFT magnitudes in special frequencies such as 12, 13, 14, 
15 and 16 kHz, which are reserved for scaling factor, are 
changed by the value of s. Consequently, in the receiver s 
will be available. Similarly, we use a 16-bit space 
available for embedding secret information which begins 
after the first FFT coefficient with a zero magnitude from 
a selected frequency (e.g. 15 kHz) to embed the values of 
the low and high frequencies of the selected frequency 
band. For example, if we embed at the frequency band 
from 12.3 to 16.7 kHz, we multiply them by ten and 
change them to binary values  
 
 
Fig. 2. Reserved positions for s and frequency bands 
(01111011)2 = 123 and (10100111)2 = 167. After that, 
these binary streams are embedded in the free space found 
next to the selected frequency (15 kHz). The first bit of 
123, is embedded in first available space after the selected 
position, and so on. Fig. 2. shows an example of the 
reserved positions for s and the frequency band. 
The security of this method requires that the frequency 
band and the scaling factor s are not known by an attacker. 
Note that if an attacker does not know the scaling factor s, 
it will not be possible for him or her to analyze the values 
of the FFT magnitudes to determine the position of the 
embedded bits. For example, the rounded FFT magnitudes 
after scaling by s = 0.2 or s = 0.4 are completely different. 
If the attacker does not know the frequency band either, it 
becomes even more difficult for him or her to try to 
determine the interval of the FFT spectrum which carries 
the secret information. 
In order to keep both the frequency band and the scaling 
parameter secret, there are two possibilities. The first one 
would be to consider both s and the frequency band as part 
of the secret key. In that case, the values of these 
parameters should not be embedded in the marked audio 
sequence and they should be transmitted as side 
information over a secured channel. At the receiver side, 
this information would be given to the extractor in order to 
recover the hidden data. 
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A second possibility introduces security even if the 
frequency band and the scaling parameter are embedded as 
suggested above. The following security measures are 
required: 
1. The values of s and the frequency band should 
not be embedded as clear text. The bits which 
form the values must be scrambled using a 
Pseudo Random Binary Sequence (PRBS) 
generated through a secret key (seed) and the 
embedded values would be the result of an XOR 
sum of the bits of the original parameters (s and 
the frequency band limits) and the bits of the 
PRBS. The secret key would be also needed at 
the detector side in order to unscramble the 
values of s and the frequency band. 
2. The FFT positions for embedding the values of s 
and the frequency bands should not be fixed. 
Instead of using fixed frequencies (like 12, 13, 
14, 15 or 16 kHz) the position must be also 
generated with a Pseudo Random Number 
Generator (PRNG) in some interval (e.g. [12, 16] 
kHz) using a secret key (seed) which is required 
at both the sender and the receiver. This 
procedure makes it impossible for an attacker to 
destroy the values of s and the frequency band, 
since he or she cannot know the position of these 
data in the FFT spectrum. In order to destroy 
them, it would be required to disturb a wide 
interval of the spectrum and, thus, the quality of 
the attacked signal would also be damaged and 
would become unusable. 
To increase security even further, a PRNG can also be 
used to change the secret bit stream to a scrambled stream. 
For example, the embedded bitstream can be constructed 
as the XOR sum of the real watermark and a PRBS. The 
seed of the PRNG would be required as a secret key both 
at the embedder and the detector. The usage of PRNG to 
increase the security of watermarking schemes is discussed 
in the literature (for example in [8]). 
 
3. Experimental results 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method, male 
speech in English in spme50_1, violoncello in vioo10_2, 
trumpet in trpt21_2, soprano in sopr44_1, quartet in 
quar48_1 have been selected from the Sound Quality 
Assessment Material (SQAM) [12]. Also, to consider the 
applicability of the scheme in a real scenario, the song 
“Thousand Yard Stare” (3:57)   included in the album Rust 
by No, Really [13] has been selected. All audio clips are 
sampled at 44.1 kHz with 16 bits per sample and two 
channels. The experiments have been performed for each 
channel of the audio signals separately.  
The Objective Difference Grade (ODG) is used to 
evaluate the transparency of the proposed algorithm. The 
ODG is one of the output values of the ITU-R BS.1387 
PEAQ [14] standard, where ODG = 0 means no 
degradation and ODG = –4 means a very annoying 
distortion. Additionally, the OPERA software [15] based 
on the ITU-R BS.1387 has been used to compute this 
objective measure of quality.  
Table 2 illustrates the tuning parameters, perceptual 
distortion and payload for six mono signals for BER equal 
zero under the MP3-128 attack. The tuning parameters 
have been chosen manually just to test the system for 
different tuning settings (i.e. we have not followed the 
flowchart depicted in Fig. 1). Table 3 shows the effect of  
Table 2: Parameters and results of 5 mono signals (BER=0 under MP3-128) 
Audio 
File s 
Frequency 
band 
(kHz) 
ODG of 
marked 
signal 
Payload 
(bps) 
spme50_1 0.3 15.5-16.9 – 0.18 1478 
vioo10_2 0.5 8-16.9 – 0.34 8719 
trpt21_2 3.5 8.5-16.9 – 0.39 7934 
sopr44_1 0.35 10-16.9 – 0.30 7006 
quar48_1 0.7 13.5-16.9 – 0.34 3177 
Thousand 
Yard Stare [0.1, 0.6] 15-16.9 – 0.78 1849 
 
various attacks, provided by the Stirmark Benchmark for 
Audio (SMBA) v1.0 [16], on ODG and BER for the five 
selected SQAM signals. E.g. the row “Amplify” shows 
that the changes in volume of the watermarked signal has 
BER equal to zero when the alteration of volume is within 
the interval [0.8, 1.45]. As described in Section 2, the 
frequency band and the scaling factor s are the two 
parameters of the method. These parameters were selected 
for each signal, then the embedding method has been 
applied, the Stirmark Benchmark for Audio (SMBA) 
software has been used to attack the marked files and, 
finally, the detection method has been performed for the 
attacked files. The ODG in Table 3 is calculated between 
the marked and the attacked-marked files. The parameters 
of the attacks are defined based on SMBA web site [16]. 
For example, in AddBrumm, 1-7000 shows the strength 
and 0-14000 shows the frequency. This row illustrates that 
any value in the range 1-7000 for the strength and 1-14000 
for the frequency could be used without any change in 
BER. In fact, this table provides the worst and best results 
for the five test signals based on BER and, in the case with 
the same BER, based on the limitation of the parameters. 
The only attack in Table 3 which removes the hidden data 
is FFT_Stat1, which is able to remove the secret data for 
one of the SQAM files (BER = 27%). Note, however, that 
the ODG of this attack is extremely low (–4). This means 
that the attack does not only removes the hidden data, but 
also destroys the perceptual quality of the host signal. 
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The SQAM files are short clips (30 seconds or less), 
and it is not necessary to use synchronization marks with 
them, since the whole file can be used in the embedding 
and extracting processes with short enough CPU time.  
Table 3: Robustness test results for five SQAM selected files 
Attack name State 
ODG of 
attacked 
file 
BER 
% parameters 
No attack – 0 0 – 
MP3 – –0.1 0 ≥ 128 
AddBrumm best –1.75 0 1-7000,1-14000 
worst –3.58 0.5 1-7000,1-750 
AddDynNoise best – 0.71 0 1-4 
worst – 0.32 0.5 1 
ADDFFTNoise best –1.47 0 4096,1-8800 
worst –1.48 0 2,1-150 
Addnoise best –1.46 0 1-115 
worst –1.94 0 1-21 
AddSinus best –1.25 0 No Limitation 
worst –3.33 0 
Amplify – – 0.1 0 80-145 
FFT_Invert best –1.61 0 No limitation 
worst –3.66 0 
FFT_RealReverse best –3.56 0 No limitation 
worst –3.96 0 
FFT_Stat1 best –3.98 0 1024 
worst -3.96 27 
Invert best –1.63 0 – 
worst –3.63 0 
RC_LowPass best – 0.1 0 Selected frequency band in passing area worst – 0.25 0 
RC_HighPass best –3.29 0 Selected frequency band in passing area worst –3.59 0 
Table 4: Robustness test results for “Thousand Yard Stare”  
Attack name 
ODG of 
attacked 
file 
BER 
% 
SYNC 
 error 
parameters 
No attack 0 0 0 – 
MP3 –0.1 0 0/23 ≥ 128 
AddBrumm –3.6 1 0/23 1-7500,1-5000 
AddDynNoise – 2.2 0 0/23 1-2 
ADDFFTNoise –1.1 0 0/23 4096,1-8800 
Addnoise –0.5 0 0/23 1-60 
AddSinus –3.3 0 0/23 No Limitation  
Amplify –0.1 0 0/23 80-145 
FFT_Invert –3.7 0 0/23 No limitation 
FFT_RealReverse –3.7 3 1/23 No limitation 
FFT_Stat1 –3.9 36 3/23 1024 
Invert –3.7 0 0/23 – 
RC_LowPass –0.2 0 0/23 Selected frequency band in passing area 
RC_HighPass –3.7 0 0/23 Selected frequency band in passing area 
 
 
 
In order to reduce computation time and memory usage, 
the near 4-minute long “Thousand Yard Stare” song was 
divided into 23 clips of 10 seconds each. Then, the 
synchronization method described in [10] and the 
embedding algorithm described in this paper was applied 
for each clip separately. For this song, 16 synchronization 
bits, “1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0” with a quantization 
factor equal to 0.125, were embedded in the first 80 
samples of each clip and then the information watermark 
was embedded in the remaining samples of the 10-second 
segment. Finally all these 10-second clips were joined 
together to generate the marked signal. We have used 
different scaling factors in the range [0.1, 0.6] for different 
clips. The payload and transparency results given in Table 
2 for this file consider the effect of both the 
synchronization codes and the information watermarks. 
Table 4 shows the effect of various attacks on ODG and 
BER for the marked “Thousand Yard Stare” signal. The 
whole file is attacked, then it is scanned in time domain to 
find the synchronization codes and, finally, the secret 
information of each clip is extracted. The “SYNC error” 
column shows the detection error of synchronization code 
after attacks, which shows that the synchronization 
algorithm [10] is robust against attacks. Figure 3 visualizes 
the test results. This plot shows how the capacity and 
perceptual distortion are changed with different tuning 
parameters. The BER for all test results under the MP3-
128 attack on this plot is equal to zero. 
Only a few attacks, such as low pass filter ─which only 
leaves low frequencies unaltered─ with a cut-off 
frequency less than 6 kHz damage the hidden data. 
However, the ODG of this attack is extremely low (about –
3.5, i.e. very annoying). This means that the attack does 
not only remove the hidden data, but also destroys the 
perceptual quality of the host signal. On the other hand, if 
the cut-off frequency is larger than 8 kHz the BER is about 
zero and the ODG of attack is in the acceptable range.  
A very relevant issue in audio watermarking is 
computation time. As FFT is a fast transform, this method 
is very useful for real-time applications. Table 5 illustrates 
the embedding and extracting times and compares them 
with the computation time of FFT and the Daubechies 
wavelet transform. The results for the song “Thousand 
Yard Stare” are the average of all the 10-second clips. It is 
worth mentioning that these computation times have been 
obtained with an Intel (R) core (TM) 2 Duo 2.2 GHz CPU 
and 2 GB of RAM memory. It can be noticed that the 
extracting time is one order of magnitude smaller than the 
file playing time. Thus, it is perfectly possible to recover 
the embedded data in a real-time scenario. 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3. Comparison between payload (bps) and Transparency (ODG) for 
BER=0 under MP3 attack (bitrate 128 kbps) 
Table 5: Computation time 
Audio 
File 
Time 
(sec) 
FFT 
time 
Db2 
time 
Embedding 
time (sec) 
Extracting 
time (sec) 
spme50_1 18 0.46 0.50 1.78 1.67 
vioo10_2 30 0.57 0.47 4.30 4.01 
trpt21_2 17.8 0.58 0.48 1.89 1.76 
sopr44_1 23.5 0.60 0.53 3.65 3.30 
quar48_1 23 0.59 0.48 2.59 2.29 
Thousand 
Yard Stare 23×10 0.17 0.15 0.69 0.59 
 
The method proposed in this paper has been compared 
with several recent audio watermarking strategies. It must 
be taken into account that none of the works in the 
reviewed literature produce capacity of the order of 5 
kbps, such as the proposed scheme. All the audio data 
hiding schemes which produce very high capacity are 
fragile against signal processing attacks. Because of this, it 
is not possible to establish a comparison of the proposed 
scheme with other audio watermarking schemes which are 
similar to it as capacity is concerned. Hence, we have 
chosen a few recent and relevant audio watermarking 
schemes in the literature. In Table 6, we compare the 
performance of the proposed watermarking algorithm and 
several recent audio watermarking strategies robust against 
the MP3 attack. The results are given for SQAM files. [4-
6, 9] use SQAM [12] files for evaluating their suggested 
schemes. All the schemes in this table are robust against 
MP3 compression with a 128 kbps bitrate. Under this 
attack, the BER is equal to zero for all the compared 
schemes.  
[7] Evaluates distortion by mean opinion score (MOS), 
which is a subjective measurement, and achieves 
transparency between imperceptible and perceptible but 
not annoying, MOS = 4.7. [4, 5, 9] have a low capacity but 
are robust against common attacks. 
Capacity, robustness and transparency are the three main 
properties of an audio watermarking scheme. Considering 
a trade-off between these properties is necessary. E.g. [4] 
proposed a very robust, low capacity and high distortion 
scheme. However [7] and the proposed scheme introduce 
high capacity and low distortion technique but they are not 
as robust as the low-capacity method described in [4].  
This comparison shows the superiority in both capacity 
and imperceptibility of the suggested method with respect 
to other schemes in the literature. This is particularly 
relevant, since the proposed scheme is able of embedding 
much more information and, at the same time, introduces 
less distortion in the marked file. 
Table 6: Comparison of different watermarking algorithms 
Algorithm Capacity (bps) 
Imperceptibilit
y in SNR (dB) 
Imperceptibility 
(ODG) 
[4] 2 42.8 to 44.4  –1.66 to –1.88 
[9] 2.3 Not reported Not reported 
[5] 4.3 29.5 Not reported 
[6] Coded image    
with 9×35 bits 24.3 to 34.4 –0.36 to –0.72 
[7] 689 Not reported Not reported 
proposed  1478 to 8719 35.2 to 44.6 –0.18 to –0.78 
 
In the last few years, very good results in image data 
hiding have been published. Ni et al. [17] proposed a high 
capacity data hiding with very low distortion. For general 
test images such as Lena and Baboon they embedded 
about 5 kbit in the whole image with PSNR above 40 dB, 
i.e. the embedding rate for a 512×512×8 image is 0.0024 
bits of information per each image bit. The proposed 
method in this paper embeds about 5 kbit in a second. It 
means 5 kbit in 44100×16 bits that equals to 0.0071 per 
audio bit. If we consider the compression rate of MP3-128 
(about 12:1), since this method completely robust against 
MP3-128,  the embedding rate for each bit of audio sample 
equals 0.085, that is 35 times more than the information bit 
rate achieved with the image method of Ni et al. Some 
other image data-hiding schemes have been presented [18] 
increasing the payload up to 0.02 bits per image bit. Even 
in this case, the suggested audio scheme presented here 
achieves more than four times that capacity. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we describe a high-capacity watermarking 
algorithm for digital audio which is robust against 
common audio signal processing. A scaling factor (s) and 
the selected frequency band to embed the hidden 
information are the two parameters of this method which 
regulate the capacity, the perceptual distortion and the 
robustness of the scheme. Furthermore, the suggested 
scheme is blind, since it does not need the original signal 
for extracting the hidden bits. The experimental results 
show that this scheme has a high capacity (about 5 kbps) 
without significant perceptual distortion and provides 
robustness against common signal processing attacks such 
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as noise, filtering or MPEG compression (MP3). Besides, 
the proposed method achieves a higher embedded bit to 
host bit rate than recent image data hiding methods. In 
addition, the CPU time required by the proposed scheme is 
short enough to use the scheme in real-time applications. 
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